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"agents." Last term, in Maples v. Thomas, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the application of
agency principles in the habeas context, but carved out an exception for clients who are
"abandoned" by their attorneys. This Note explores the potential scope of the "abandonment"
exception, and argues that federal habeas courts should draw on principles drawn from civil
litigation cases and apply a flexible approach to determining when a client has effectively been
"abandoned" by his attorney.
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INTRODUCTION
Many habeas petitioners have learned that having a bad lawyer can be
worse than having no lawyer at all. Take, for example, the story of Ricky Kerr's
near execution. The lawyer appointed to represent Kerr in his state
postconviction proceedings filed a three-page habeas corpus application,
containing just one legal argument, which did not actually challenge the
validity of Kerr's trial or sentence.' His application was dismissed summarily
by the Texas courts. As Kerr's execution date approached, his lawyer began to
suffer severe health problems and stopped working on the case altogether.
Eventually, another lawyer stepped in on Kerr's behalf to file an emergency
motion with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA).' The motion
contained an affidavit from the previous attorney confessing that he may have
committed a "gross error in judgment," and that he was perhaps "not
competent to represent Mr. Kerr in a death-penalty case."' Nonetheless, the
CCA denied Mr. Kerr's application, prompting one judge to proclaim, "If
applicant is executed as scheduled, this Court is going to have blood on its
hands . . . ."s
Other lawyers have ended their clients' hopes of relief by failing to file
applications within the statutory deadlines.6 For example, the lawyers for
1. Ex parte Kerr, 977 S.W.2d 585, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Overstreet, J., dissenting).
Kerr's attorney had practiced as a lawyer for less than three years when he was appointed to
handle Kerr's state postconviction proceedings. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Gatekeeper
Court Keeps Gates Shut, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 2000, http://www.chicagotribune.com
/news/local/chi-ooo62dptexas2-story,o,7o8553,full.story.
2. Janet Elliott, Habeas System Fails Death Row Appellant, TEx. LAw., Mar. 9, 1998, at 25-26.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Kerr, 977 S.W.2d at 585 (Overstreet, J., dissenting). Two days before his scheduled
execution, a federal judge granted Kerr a stay. Armstrong & Mills, supra note 1. On
November 22, 2011, Kerr entered a guilty plea, and his sentence was reduced to life in
prison. Texas Death Penalty Developments in 2o11: The Year in Review, TEX. COALITION To
ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY lo (Dec. 2011), http://www.tcadp.org/TexasDeathPenalty
Developments2oll.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Ex parte Colella, 977 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (dismissing a state
postconviction petition filed thirty-seven days late); Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998) (dismissing a state postconviction petition filed nine days after the
deadline expired; the petitioner had been granted an initial ninety-day extension by the
court followed by an additional thirty-day extension, and the lawyer failed to meet either
deadline). Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that applications
for postconviction relief be filed within 180 days after counsel is appointed. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 11.071, § 4(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
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Roger Keith Coleman, a death-row inmate in Virginia, failed to file a notice of
appeal with the Virginia Supreme Court within the required thirty-day
window after the state court denied his habeas application.7 The Supreme
Court held that Coleman's lawyers' failure to file a timely notice of appeal
foreclosed further review of his constitutional claims.
The Coleman Court reasoned that because "the attorney is the petitioner's
agent" within the scope of the litigation, "the petitioner must 'bear the risk of
attorney error." Under this rule, because habeas petitioners do not have a
constitutional right to counsel during postconviction proceedings,"o petitioners
whose lawyers filed woefully inadequate or untimely habeas petitions typically
did not have any remedy. However, in a trio of recent decisions -Holland v.
Florida," Maples v. Thomas," and Martinez v. Ryan'3 - the Court injected some
flexibility into the strict Coleman rule and fashioned remedies for habeas
petitioners with negligent lawyers. Unfortunately, the Court's reasoning from
case to case has been inconsistent and murky and has given little guidance to
lower courts concerning the scope of the remedy.
7. Coleman v. Thompson, 895 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990), affd, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991).
8. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757.
9. Id. at 753 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
10. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
M. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). In Holland, a court-appointed attorney failed to file a federal habeas
corpus petition within the one-year deadline and also failed to communicate with his client.
Id. at 2555-56. The Supreme Court held that the one-year deadline is subject to equitable
tolling in appropriate cases, id. at 2560, and remanded the case to the lower court to
determine whether the attorney's misconduct in this case was egregious enough to justify
equitable tolling, id. at 2564-65.
12. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012). Corey Maples was represented by two Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys
serving pro bono during his state postconviction proceedings. Id. at 918. While his petition
for postconviction relief was pending in the Alabama trial court, his attorneys left the firm
without notifying him or the court. Id. at 919. The trial court denied his petition, and
Maples's time to appeal ran out without his realizing that he was no longer represented by
his attorneys. Id. at 920. The Court held that in situations where a client is "abandoned" by
his attorneys, he cannot be charged with the acts and omissions of those attorneys. Id. at
924.
13. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). Arizona law provided that the petitioner could only raise an
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in postconviction proceedings. Id. at 1314.
Martinez's postconviction counsel failed to raise that claim, choosing instead to file a
statement that she could not find any colorable claims for relief. Id. The Court reserved the
question of whether petitioners have a constitutional right to postconviction counsel
in collateral proceedings that provide the first opportunity to raise an
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, but held that ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel could provide cause to excuse a petitioner's failure to raise an
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a timely manner. Id. at 1315.
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This Note offers a new approach to understanding the Court's
jurisprudence in this area. I argue that much of the confusion stems from the
fact that the Court has vacillated between two different analytic models
in evaluating attorney conduct-a performance-based model and a
relationship-based model. These models, as explained in Part II of this Note,
address different aspects of an attorney's conduct. The performance-based
model, which examines a lawyer's efforts on behalf of his client, is more robust
because it imposes a baseline standard of reasonableness on an attorney's work.
However, it only applies when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
attached.' 4 In circumstances where individuals do not have a constitutional
guarantee of counsel, a relationship-based model, which examines the
attorney-client relationship through the lens of agency law, governs. Part III of
this Note examines how lower courts have alternated between the two models
to evaluate attorney misconduct in the collateral-review context, with the
Supreme Court attempting in Maples to resituate the doctrine firmly within the
relationship-based model.
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that federal habeas courts should embrace a
flexible application of the relationship-based model to address the misconduct
of postconviction attorneys. This portion of my Note offers a novel approach to
understanding the consequences and potential of the relationship-based model
after Maples. The analytic foundation for the relationship-based model derives
from agency principles that have governed attorney-client relationships in the
civil litigation"s context. The Coleman Court explicitly borrowed these concepts
from civil cases and applied them to the procedural-default habeas
jurisprudence. However, the Coleman Court failed to appreciate that courts
hearing civil cases have long applied an extremely flexible approach to agency
principles. In a body of cases, civil litigants have sought to reopen cases that
trial courts have dismissed due to their lawyers' negligence.' 6 The lower courts,
14. The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the assistance of counsel.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This right attaches at a defendant's initial
appearance before a judicial officer. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194
(2008).
15. The term "civil litigation," as used in this Note, does not include habeas proceedings, even
though such proceedings are technically civil in nature. See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4)
(providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas corpus proceedings to
the extent that they are not inconsistent with federal habeas statutes and rules governing
habeas proceedings specifically); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 654 n-4 (2005) ("Habeas
corpus proceedings are characterized as civil in nature.").
16. These litigants relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6o(b)(6), which allows courts to
grant relief from a final judgment, such as a dismissal for failure to prosecute, for any
"reason that justifies relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 6o(b)(6).
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in analyzing these cases, have applied the agency principles that the Supreme
Court applied in Coleman, yet have done so much more flexibly. I argue that
these civil cases should guide lower courts attempting to apply the
relationship-based model most recently affirmed in Maples. By doing so, the
courts can create parity between the strictness of agency principles as applied to
civil litigants and habeas petitioners and, most importantly, can protect habeas
petitioners from suffering the harsh consequences that can result from a
negligent attorney's mistakes.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In this Part, I briefly describe how an individual's right to counsel changes
at different stages of a criminal case." This discussion provides a context in
which to place the two models described by this Note. The Sixth Amendment
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."'" In Gideon v.
Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that states were required to provide
counsel in all felony cases. 9 The right to counsel lasts until the trial judge
determines the sentence to be imposed."o Defendants also have a right to
counsel in their first appeals of right (i.e., appeals to which all defendants are
entitled under the relevant state statute or federal law)." The right to counsel
also means that the defendant has the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.' In other words, whenever the Sixth Amendment guarantees
17. A comprehensive description of criminal procedure and right-to-counsel jurisprudence is
beyond the scope of this Note.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. 372 U.S. at 344 ("[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him."). In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Court held that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments require "that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel
in his defense." Id. at 373-74.
2o. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (holding that defendants have a right to
counsel at the time of sentencing, even though the defendants' sentencing in the instant case
had been deferred subject to probation).
n. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
22. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Strickland established "a two-part
test for evaluating claims that a defendant's counsel performed so incompetently in his or
her representation of a defendant that the defendant's sentence or conviction should be
reversed." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002). A defendant must prove that counsel's
"representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland, 466 U.S. at
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appointment of counsel, the appointed counsel must meet certain standards of
performance. However, the flip side is that the right to effective assistance of
counsel is dependent on the defendant having a constitutional right to counsel.
There are various critical stages of a criminal case in which a defendant does not
have a constitutional right to counsel, and these stages are the focus of this
Note.
Defendants do not have a right to counsel in their discretionary appeals to
the state's highest court or in filing a petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. 3 After a defendant has completed direct-review proceedings,
he may file a petition for postconviction relief in state trial court. This is known
as a "collateral attack" on the conviction, and each state has different
procedures and terminology for this stage of the process." State postconviction
proceedings are frequently the first available forum for the petitioner to raise
certain constitutional claims, such as ineffective assistance of trial counsel or
suppression of evidence." Finally, a prisoner subsequently may file a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Various state and federal
statutes provide for the appointment of counsel for indigent petitioners in
postconviction or habeas proceedings," but because the petitioner does not
have a constitutional right to counsel at that stage, he does not have a guarantee
of effective counsel. The Supreme Court has held that there is no Sixth
688, and also that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694. A defendant also
has the right to effective assistance of counsel when he has a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel on appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) ("A first appeal as of right
therefore is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have
the effective assistance of an attorney.").
23. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 6oo, 616-17 (1974).
24. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219 (2002) ("In most States, relevant state law sets forth
some version of the following collateral review procedures. First, the prisoner files a petition
in a state court of first instance, typically a trial court. Second, a petitioner seeking to appeal
from the trial court's judgment must file a notice of appeal . .. . Third, a petitioner seeking
further review of an appellate court's judgment must file a further notice of appeal to the
state supreme court. . . ." (citations omitted)). For a survey of postconviction remedies in all
fifty states and the District of Columbia, see DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE
POsT-CONvICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK WITH FoRMs (2009).
25. See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 7.1(b) (6th ed. 2011). For example, many states require petitioners to wait
until state postconviction proceedings to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial or
appellate counsel. Id. 5 7 .1(b) n.77.
26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 5 3599 (20o6) (providing for the appointment of counsel for all indigent
capital prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief); id. 5 3oo6A (requiring district courts
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Amendment17 or due process right,8 to counsel in habeas or collateral-review
proceedings. The remainder of this Note examines the Supreme Court's recent
efforts to address the consequences facing habeas petitioners saddled with
grossly negligent representation during their postconviction proceedings.
II. PERFORMANCE-BASED AND RELATIONSHIP-BASED MODELS IN
THE LAW OF PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
The Supreme Court has vacillated between two models in its decisions
addressing the right to counsel and the effect of attorney conduct on a habeas
petitioner's ability to present his claims, which I term the "performance-based"
model and the "relationship-based" model. In this Part, I describe these models
and the analytically distinct foundations of each one. I then examine the role
that these models have played in the development of the Supreme Court's
procedural-default jurisprudence. Finally, I step back from the theoretical
discussion to examine the defects in the system of appointing and monitoring
postconviction attorneys to highlight the serious consequences facing habeas
petitioners who are bound by the conduct of their attorneys.
A. Two Frameworks for Analyzing Attorney Misconduct
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning when clients should be
bound by the misconduct, negligence, or mistakes of their attorneys has
utilized two analytically distinct models: a performance-based model and a
relationship-based model. The basic distinction between these two models is as
follows: the performance-based model evaluates the level and quality of work
an attorney has done on a client's behalf, while the relationship-based model
examines the nature of the relationship between the lawyer and the client. This
Section fleshes out the distinctions between the two in more detail.
The clearest example of the performance-based model is the test used to
evaluate whether a defendant's constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment has been violated. The Strickland v. Washington standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel imposes a minimum performance standard on
27. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (stating that the Court had "never held that
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their
convictions" in state courts and "declin[ing] to so hold").
28. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 1o (1989).
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trial lawyers." Under the performance prong of the two-part Strickland
standard, the "defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." 3o
While an extensive discussion of Strickland jurisprudence is beyond the
scope of this Note, it is sufficient for the purposes of this discussion to note
that the Strickland performance standard applies across the board to all
attorneys who are appointed to fulfill a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Courts applying this standard examine whether the attorney's
performance was reasonable "under prevailing professional norms."3" Several
Supreme Court decisions have fleshed out the minimum efforts that attorneys
must make in order to fulfill the performance prong of the Strickland test. For
example, trial lawyers in a capital case must at least investigate the defendant's
prior convictions when they know that the state will attempt to use the
defendant's prior history as an aggravating sentencing factor" and must also
present mitigating evidence during sentencing." Courts have also used a
performance-based model to evaluate when attorney negligence should be
grounds for equitable tolling of the one-year federal habeas deadline, with their
analysis focusing on whether the negligence was "ordinary," or "sufficiently
egregious" to warrant equitable tolling.3 I will return to this body of cases in
29. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Court has also held that defendants have a constitutional
right to counsel on their first appeals as of right under the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (guaranteeing the right to effective assistance of
counsel on the first appeal as of right); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963)
(holding that defendants are guaranteed the right to counsel on their first appeals as of
right).
30. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Defendants must also show that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial; this is known as the "prejudice" prong. Id. at 687.
31. Id. at 688.
32. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (holding that the trial lawyers "were
deficient in failing to examine the court file on [defendant]'s prior conviction" when they
were on notice that the state intended to use the defendant's prior history as an aggravating
sentencing factor).
33. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533-35 (2003) (holding that counsel fell below
Strickland's performance standard by failing to adequately investigate the defendant's
background to prepare a mitigation case); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393-96 (2000)
(holding that counsel fell below Strickland's performance standard by failing to prepare for
the sentencing phase of the defendant's trial until a week before the trial, by failing to
conduct an adequate investigation into the defendant's background, and by failing to
introduce available evidence that the defendant was borderline mentally retarded).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 4o8 F.3 d 1o89, 1093 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[S]erious attorney
misconduct, as opposed to mere negligence, 'may warrant equitable tolling."' (quoting
Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 2002))); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 8oo (9 th
Cir. 2003) ("Though ordinary attorney negligence will not justify equitable tolling, we have
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Section III.A, but it is important to note at this point that the focus of a
performance-based inquiry is, unsurprisingly, the attorney's performance.
Courts examine the amount and quality of work the attorney performed, such
as the level of investigation the attorney undertook.15 Once the lawyer's work
falls below an acceptable level of reasonableness (or alternatively, once the
lawyer's negligence becomes "sufficiently egregious"), the client will no longer
be bound by that lawyer's acts and omissions. 6
In contrast, courts applying the relationship-based model examine the
nature of the attorney-client relationship. This model is premised on the
principle that "the attorney is the [client]'s agent when acting, or failing to act,
in furtherance of the litigation."37 As the Supreme Court explained recently in
Maples v. Thomas, a "principal bears the risk of negligent conduct on the part of
his agent" unless the attorney "abandons" the client and thereby severs the
principal-agent relationship. 8 Courts applying the relationship-based model
acknowledged that where an attorney's misconduct is sufficiently egregious, it may
constitute an 'extraordinary circumstance' warranting equitable tolling of AEDPA's statute
of limitations." (quoting Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003); Miles v.
Prunty, 187 F. 3 d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999))).
3s. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521-34 (noting that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary" and holding that under the facts of this particular case, in which counsel had
some evidence indicating that their client had a troubled childhood, counsel's failure to
investigate further fell below the professional standards that prevailed at the time and
therefore was ineffective assistance of counsel within the meaning of Strickland (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91)).
36. In order to prevail on a Strickland claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show both deficient performance and prejudice resulting from counsel's failures. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687. In Wiggins, for example, the Court examined the nature of the mitigating
evidence that counsel failed to present during sentencing and "flound] there to be a
reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of this history, would have
introduced it at sentencing," 539 U.S. at 535, as well as that "had the jury been confronted
with this considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would
have returned with a different sentence," id. at 536. The Court therefore remanded the case
for further proceedings. Id. at 538.
37. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991). "Agency" is defined as "the fiduciary
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 11 (1958).
38. 132 S. Ct. 912, 922-23 (2012). The term "abandonment," as used by the Maples Court, is
somewhat vague. The Court noted that Maples was "left without any functioning attorney
of record" and later stated that Maples "had been reduced to pro se status." Id. at 927. The
main question courts will face going forward is whether the "abandonment" exception
established by Maples extends to claims of "constructive" or "virtual" abandonment
or is limited to cases involving "actual" abandonment. I argue in Subsection IV.B.3
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therefore must examine whether the record demonstrates that the attorney was
still functioning as the client's agent at the time of the relevant act or omission.
Relevant information includes whether the attorney had acquired an adverse
interest or engaged in a serious breach of loyalty to the principal,"3 or other
evidence indicating that the attorney was leaving the client virtually
unrepresented, such as a lack of communication or actively deceiving the
client.40 Notably, if a court applies the relationship-based model and finds that
the attorney's conduct demonstrates the existence of a principal-agent
relationship, then the client is bound by his attorney's negligent conduct,
however egregious. There is therefore an "essential" analytic difference
"between a claim of attorney error, however egregious, and a claim that an
attorney had essentially abandoned his client.""' The former claim is relevant
under a performance-based standard, while the latter is relevant under a
relationship-based standard.
B. The Role ofthe Two Models in the "Procedural-Default" Doctrine
The consequences of binding a client to an attorney's errors under
either model can be severe in large part because of the Supreme Court's
"procedural-default" jurisprudence. Before 1977, habeas petitioners were
governed by the deliberate-bypass standard described in Fay v. Noia." Under
this standard, a habeas petitioner could raise claims in federal habeas
proceedings even if "because of inadvertence or neglect he r[an] afoul of a state
procedural requirement. " For example, Charles Noia did not appeal his felony
murder conviction to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court.'
His codefendants appealed their convictions and secured their release on the
that the concept of "abandonment" should be flexible enough to encompass
"constructive-abandonment" claims.
3g. See id. at 924 (noting that Maples's attorneys had severed the agency relationship by
accepting new employment that precluded them from continuing to represent Maples and
that "[t]he authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he
acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the
principal" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 112 (1957))).
40. For example, in Community Dental Services. v. Tani, the Ninth Circuit granted relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6o(b)(6) to a client whose attorneys falsely represented that
the litigation was proceeding smoothly up until the client received notice that default
judgment had been entered against him. 282 F.3d 1164, 1166-67 (9 th Cir. 2002).
41. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923.
42. 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
43. Id. at 433.
44. Id. at 395.
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ground that their confessions had been unlawfully coerced.4s Noia filed a
federal habeas petition in federal district court, seeking to set aside his
conviction because his confession had been coerced as well.46 The district court
held that he was not eligible for relief because of his failure to appeal his
conviction.4 ' The Supreme Court eventually held that federal courts had the
power to grant habeas relief notwithstanding the defendant's failure to follow
state procedures (also referred to as the defendant's "procedural default"), but
that a federal court could, at its discretion, deny the writ to an applicant who
had "deliberately by-passed" state procedures.*"
However, Wainwright v. Sykes introduced the strict procedural-default
rule.49 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, which held that the
respondent's failure to comply with the state's contemporaneous-objection
ruleso barred a federal court from hearing his claim, outlined what became
known as the cause-and-prejudice requirement for procedural defaults5
45. Id.
46. Id. at 395-96.
47. Id. at 396.
48. Id. at 438.
49. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
so. The then-existing Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(i) provided, in relevant part,
that
[u]pon motion of the defendant or upon its own motion, the court shall suppress
any confession or admission obtained illegally from the defendant.... The motion
to suppress shall be made prior to trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or
the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its
discretion may entertain the motion or an appropriate objection at the trial.
See id. at 76 n.5 (quoting FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190, In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272
So. 2d 65, 97 (1972) (amended 2000)). In Wainwright, the petitioner, John Sykes, was
convicted of third-degree murder. Id. at 74. When police arrived at the scene of the murder,
Sykes voluntarily told them that he had shot the victim. Id. He was immediately arrested
and taken to the police station, where he was read his Miranda rights. Id. Sykes made a
statement, which was later admitted into evidence at trial, admitting that he had shot the
victim. Id. Sykes's lawyer never challenged the admissibility of these statements during trial,
nor did Sykes challenge the admission of the inculpatory statements on appeal. Id. at 75. In
later filings, however, Sykes "challenged the statements made to police on grounds of
involuntariness." Id. The Supreme Court concluded "that Florida procedure did,
consistently with the United States Constitution, require that respondent's confession be
challenged at trial or not at all, and thus his failure to timely object to its admission
amounted to an independent and adequate state procedural ground which would have
prevented direct review here." Id. at 86-87.
si. The development of the procedural-default doctrine in federal habeas litigation has had a
significant impact on the availability of federal review. One recent study of habeas corpus
petitions filed since 1996 found that 42.2% of capital cases had a "ruling that at least one
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"[C]ontentions of federal law which were not resolved on the merits in the
state proceeding due to respondent's failure to raise them there as required by
state procedure" shall not be heard by a federal habeas judge "absent a showing
of 'cause' and 'prejudice."'5 2 He claimed that the deliberate-bypass rule from
Noia "may encourage 'sandbagging' on the part of defense lawyers," who
would take their chances on an acquittal in state court while planning to
present their constitutional claims in federal habeas proceedings if the "initial
gamble" failed.s"
Since Wainwright, the Court has struggled to justify why the
procedural-default rule should operate to penalize clients for their lawyers'
omissions or mistakes, and has used both performance-based and
relationship-based understandings of attorney behavior in its analysis.
Notably, in his dissent from Wainwright, Justice Brennan vigorously argued
against reliance on a relationship-based theory to charge clients with the acts
and omissions of their lawyers. He noted that clients were not involved in most
decisions to circumvent state procedures and argued that it was unfair to hold
clients responsible through the use of agency principles for their attorneys'
claim was barred by procedural default." Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II & Brian J.
Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study
of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. 48 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi
/nij/grants/219559.pdf.
52. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87. The Supreme Court has since defined "cause" as a factor
external to the defense that prevented an issue from being raised in a timely manner. For
example, in Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988), the Court found cause for a defendant's
failure to raise in the state trial court a challenge to the composition of the grand jury pool
after the defendant showed that a memorandum by the state district attorney directing the
jury commissioners to underrepresent blacks and women in the master jury lists had been
concealed by county officials. Id. at 222-24. Because of this misconduct on the part of county
officials, the grounds for the challenge were not reasonably available to Amadeo's lawyers at
the time they were required to challenge the jury. Id. In order to show prejudice, a defendant
must establish that the alleged constitutional errors worked to the actual and substantial
disadvantage of the defendant, "infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). The test for prejudice derives
from the test for materiality of undisclosed exculpatory evidence. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) ("[T]he appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots
in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the
prosecution . . . . The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.").
53. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89.
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mistakes.s4 Justice Brennan argued that, although agency principles had
traditionally provided the justification for binding clients to the actions of their
agent-lawyers,ss "no fictional relationship of principal-agent or the like can
justify holding the criminal defendant accountable for the naked errors of his
attorney" when fundamental constitutional rights are at stake.s" This is
especially true for indigent defendants given that they are often "without any
realistic choice in selecting who ultimately represents them at trial."s7 Despite
Justice Brennan's argument, later Supreme Court cases have explicitly adopted
agency principles to justify charging criminal defendants and habeas
petitioners with the acts and omissions of their lawyers.
A comparison between two key cases, Murray v. Carriers8 and Coleman v.
Thompson,"9 demonstrates the interplay between the two models. In Murray,
after Clifford Carrier was convicted by a Virginia jury of rape and abduction,
his lawyer filed a notice of appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, which
included seven substantive claims. 60 However, when filing the petition for
appeal, the lawyer inadvertently left out one of these claims."' The Virginia
Supreme Court refused the appeal, and eventually Carrier filed a pro se federal
habeas petition, attempting to renew the forgotten claim.62 He argued that he
should not be foreclosed from raising the claim because of his lawyer's mistake
during the state direct appeal.3
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that only "some objective factor
external to the defense" can provide sufficient "cause" to excuse a procedural
54. Justice Brennan argued that "the ordinary procedural default is born of the inadvertence,
negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial counsel." Id. at 104 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
55. See id. at 114 n.13. Justice Brennan noted, "Traditionally, the rationale for binding a criminal
defendant by his attorney's mistakes has rested on notions akin to agency law." Id. He
argued that while agency principles may make sense within the context of commercial
law, where "the common law established and recognized principal-agent relationships for
the protection of innocent third parties who deal with the [agents]," the application of these
principles to the criminal law context is inappropriate because "the State, primarily in
control of the criminal process and responsible for qualifying and assigning attorneys to
represent the accused, is not a wholly innocent bystander." Id.
56. Id. at 114.
57. Id.
58. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
59. 501 U.S. 722 (1991)
60. 477 U.S. at 482.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 482-83.
63. Id. at 483.
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default. It rejected Carrier's claim, holding that "[s]o long as a defendant is
represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective
under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington . . . , [there is] no
inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a
procedural default.",6 The best way to understand the Court's statement is to
think of attorney performance along a spectrum. Once an attorney's
performance drops below a particular threshold, then the attorney's
performance is ineffective under Strickland. As long as the attorney's
performance remains above the threshold, then the defendant-client will be
charged with mistakes made by the attorney. When the lawyer's performance
drops below the threshold, however, then there is a Strickland violation, and
the Sixth Amendment requires that the "responsibility for the default be
imputed to the State."66Murray therefore established that, in contexts in which
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies, a performance-based standard
governs.
Contrast Murray with Coleman v. Thompson, where the Court held that in
contexts in which the Sixth Amendment does not apply,6 , the
relationship-based model governs." As discussed in this Note's Introduction,
Coleman involved a habeas petitioner whose lawyers failed to file a timely
notice of appeal during the thirty-day window for state habeas proceedings.
The Court invoked agency law to explain why Coleman was bound by his
lawyers' procedural default. The Court stated, "Attorney ignorance or
inadvertence is not 'cause' because the attorney is the petitioner's agent when
acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must
64. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
6s. Id. This standard for showing cause is quite a bit stricter than the one outlined by the Court
in Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984). See id. at 14 ("[T]he cause requirement may be satisfied
under certain circumstances when a procedural failure is not attributable to an intentional
decision by counsel made in pursuit of his client's interests."). This defendant-friendly
dictum from Reed was written by Justice Brennan, who had rejected agency principles in his
dissent in Wainwright, arguing that it would be more appropriate to attribute lawyers'
mistakes to the state due to its role in training, certifying, and appointing counsel. See
Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 114 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. This is a fairly high bar to meet, notably because a single isolated
episode of procedural default will not generally give rise to a successful claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and
Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 679, 682 (1990).
67. The Court has held twice that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee counsel to
petitioners during state postconviction relief proceedings. See supra text accompanying notes
27-28.
68. 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991).
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'bear the risk of attorney error."'96 According to the relationship-based model
espoused in Coleman, "well-settled principles of agency law" require that the
principal (the client) bear the risk of harm caused by the agent (the lawyer) in
the scope of the agent's employment.70 Under the Coleman Court's strict
application of the relationship-based model, even the attorney-agent's
negligence is imputed to the client.
C. Postconviction Counsel in the States
This Section briefly describes the disparity among the states concerning the
standards for appointing postconviction counsel in order to highlight the
consequences that can result from requiring habeas petitioners to bear the risk
of their attorneys' mistakes. The Court's awareness of the severe flaws within
some states' postconviction systems may have influenced its recent decisions
injecting some flexibility into the Coleman rule. Notably, Justice Ginsburg's
opinion in Maples v. Thomas included a lengthy indictment of Alabama's
system of appointing counsel to indigent defendants.7' She noted, among other
defects, that Alabama is "[n]early alone among the States . . . [in] not
guarantee[ing] representation to indigent capital defendants in postconviction
proceedings"7 ' and that some death-row inmates in the state receive no
postconviction representation."
Of course, Alabama is not alone in failing to provide adequate counsel to
defendants during postconviction proceedings. While most states with the
death penalty74 do provide for the appointment of counsel to death-row
69. Id. (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488).
70. Id. at 754 (noting that the "master is subject to liability for harm caused by negligent
conduct of [the] servant within the scope of employment" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 242 (1958))).
71. 132 S. Ct. 912, 917-19 (2012).
72. Id. at 918.
73. Id.
74. Many states with the death penalty require mandatory appointment of postconviction
counsel upon request by the death-row inmate. See Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism:
A Functional Critique and Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 1 app. A (2002) (compiling state statutes). In six states, there is no mandatory
provision of postconviction counsel, but either the death penalty is so infrequently imposed
that volunteer counsel can handle all cases or the courts "follow a consistent policy of
appointing counsel to all indigent" death-row inmates. See id. at 16. There used to be a
network of federally funded postconviction capital defender organizations devoted to either
providing or finding representation for death-row inmates, but Congress acted in 1995 to
eliminate funding for these centers entirely. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the
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inmates during state postconviction proceedings, there is a vast disparity in the
competency requirements imposed on these attorneys. For example, article
11.071 of Texas's Code of Criminal Procedure requires the appointment of
"competent counsel" for death-row inmates during state postconviction
proceedings. 7s However, in Ex parte Graves, the Texas CCA rejected the
argument that article 11.071 imposed a baseline performance standard on
habeas counsel.76 The CCA held that the competency requirement refers only
to a "habeas counsel's qualifications, experience, and abilities at the time of his
appointment."" The statute, according to the CCA, does not indicate that the
competency requirement also applies to "the final product or services rendered
by that otherwise experienced and competent counsel." 7 In other words, there
is no requirement in Texas that a lawyer deemed competent at the time of his
appointment actually deliver competent assistance to his client.79 Given Texas's
low standards for attorney performance during state collateral proceedings, as
well as the state legislature's refusal to allocate adequate funding to the state
habeas representation project,so it is no surprise that the record of the
appointed article 11.071 attorneys is overwhelmingly dire.8 1
There are several other states that provide for the mandatory appointment
of counsel to all death-row inmates, but do not guarantee effective assistance of
postconviction counsel. For example, the Nevada Supreme Court held that
Post Conviction Defense Organizations as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REV.
863, 865 (1996); Ronald J. Tabak, Commentary, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas
Left in This Corpus?, 27 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 523, 524, 540-43 (1996).
75. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, S 2(a) (West 2005).
76. 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
77. Id. at 114.
78. Id. at 116.
79. This result conflicts with the requirements of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which provide that a lawyer "shall provide competent representation to a client." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) (emphasis added). The commentary to Rule 1.I
further provides, "Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and
analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and
procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate
preparation." Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 5.
so. TEX. DEFENDER SERv., A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAs JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 101
& n.3 (2000) (noting that when article 11.071 was enacted in 1995, the legislature
appropriated two million dollars a year for the program, which was less than half the
amount requested by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals).
81. See TEX. DEFENDER SERV., LETHAL INDIFFERENCE: THE FATAL COMBINATION OF
INCOMPETENT ATTORNEYs AND UNACCOUNTABLE COURTS IN TEXAS DEATH PENALTY APPEALS




MERE NEGLIGENCE OR ABANDONMENT?
death-row inmates have no guarantee of effective performance of
postconviction counsel on the ground that holding otherwise could lead to an
endless chain of appeals litigating the ineffectiveness of immediately preceding
postconviction counsel. Other states have followed the example of the federal
government, providing for the appointment of counsel for death-row inmates,
but explicitly foreclosing the possibility of using postconviction counsel's
ineffectiveness as a basis for relief in subsequent proceedings.' On the other
end of the spectrum, several state courts have held that their states' statutory
guarantees of counsel necessarily guarantee competent assistance of counsel.4
Despite these encouraging examples, many death-row inmates are left without
a "guarantee of competent performance" in the places where it is most
necessary; namely, "the large states of the Deep South that have collectively
carried out the overwhelming majority of post-Furman executions.",s Some
S. Bejarano v. Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996).
83. See, e.g., COLo. REv. STAT. § 16-12-20 5 (3 )(f), (5) (2006) ("The ineffectiveness of counsel
during post-conviction review shall not be a basis for relief."); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1419(c) (2011) ("[A] claim of ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel
[cannot] constitute good cause [to file a successive application]."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.21(I)(2) (West 2010) ("The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during
proceedings under this section does not constitute grounds for relief in a proceeding under
this section, in an appeal of any action under this section, or in an application to reopen a
direct appeal."). For the federal analogue, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2006), which instructs
that "[t]he ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral
post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under
section 2254."
84. See, e.g., Grinols v. State, 10 P.3d 6oo, 620 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (relying on the due
process clause of the state constitution to guarantee effective assistance of appointed
counsel); Lozada v. Warden, 613 A.2d 818, 821 (Conn. 1992) ("It would be absurd to have
the right to appointed counsel who is not required to be competent."); State v. Flansburg,
694 A.2d 462, 467 (Md. 1997) (stating that the right to a lawyer would be "hollow indeed
unless the assistance were required to be effective" (quoting Wilson v. State, 399 A.2d 256,
26o (Md. 1979))); State v. Rue, 811 A.2d 425, 433 (N.J. 2002) (noting that the New Jersey
Supreme Court's rules "state that every defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel on
a first [postconviction relief] petition; that if a defendant is indigent, counsel will be
assigned; that assigned counsel may not withdraw based on the ground of 'lack of merit' of
the petition; and that counsel should advance any grounds insisted on by defendant
notwithstanding that counsel deems them without merit").
85. Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction Counsel:
Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 350-51 (2003). The Furman decision
referred to in the quote is Furman v. Georgia, in which the Court held that imposition of the
death penalty pursuant to the state statutes at issue in that case was "cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 408 U.S. 238, 239-40
(1972). Furman led to a moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty, which ended
with the Court's ruling in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
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academics have called for the Court to constitutionalize the right to counsel in
postconviction proceedings in order to address some of the problems discussed
in this Section." Thus far, the Court has declined to do so.8 7 Instead, as I argue
in the next Part, it has vacillated between utilizing the performance-based and
relationship-based models to carve out exceptions from the general rule that
clients are bound by the mistakes and omissions of their postconviction
attorneys, without explicitly imposing a minimum standard of competence on
postconviction lawyers.
III. THE COURTS' EFFORTS TO EXEMPT HABEAS PETITIONERS FROM
THE MISTAKES OF THEIR ATTORNEYS
This Part examines how lower courts developed a body of case law
addressing the consequences of attorney misconduct in the habeas context and
how the Supreme Court's recent trio of "bad lawyer" cases clarifies (or
muddies) the law in this area. In three recent cases, Holland v. Florida," Maples
v. Thomas,89 and Martinez v. Ryan,90 the Court held that attorney errors should
not necessarily foreclose the habeas petitioners from presenting their claims.
However, the analyses underlying these holdings has varied: In Holland, the
Court employed a performance-based approach,9' while in Maples the Court
86. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings, 58
MD. L. REV. 1393, 1415-16 (1999); Hugh Mundy, Rid of Habeas Corpus? How Ineffective
Assistance ofCounsel Has Endangered Access to the Writ ofHabeas Corpus and What the Supreme
Court Can Do in Maples and Martinez To Restore It, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 213-14 (2011);
Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 6o
HASTINGS L.J. 541, 544 (2009); Amy Breglio, Note, Let Him Be Heard: The Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel on Post-Conviction Appeal in Capital Cases, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
&POL'Y 247, 249 (2011).
87. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), is the most obvious recent example of the Court
ducking the question of whether there is a constitutional right to counsel in any collateral
proceedings. Justice Kennedy noted that Coleman had left open the possibility that "the
Constitution may require States to provide counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings
because 'in [these] cases . . . state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a
challenge to his conviction."' Id. at 1315 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755
(1991)). However, he went on to state, "This is not the case ... to resolve whether that
exception exists as a constitutional matter." Id.
88. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
8g. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
go. 132 S. Ct. 1309.
91. 130 S. Ct. at 2564.
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adopted a relationship-based approach92 and recast Holland as a decision
grounded in the relationship-based model." Finally, the Court reverted to a
performance-based approach in Martinez. The Supreme Court has not been
alone in vacillating between the two models. Prior to Holland, most of the
circuits had grappled with the question of whether attorney conduct could
justify equitable tolling 4 of the one-year statute of limitations to file a federal
habeas petition imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), and these courts employed both models in their analyses.
This Part tracks the development of the equitable-tolling jurisprudence in the
circuit courts and explores the Supreme Court's three recent decisions in this
area. In my analysis of Holland, Maples, and Martinez, I also predict the
framework the Court will employ in the future to govern its application of the
performance-based model versus the relationship-based model.
A. The Development of the Equitable-TollingJurisprudence
Five years after the Court held in Coleman that agency principles bind
clients to the mistakes of their attorneys, Congress instated a one-year statute
of limitations for filing federal habeas petitions in AEDPA.s This new deadline
created a category of potential procedural defaults that had not existed when
Coleman was decided in 1991. Circuit courts were faced with the question of
92. 132 S. Ct. at 922-23.
93. Id. at 923-24.
94. A complete discussion of equitable-tolling jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Note.
Essentially, however, applying this principle to a limitations period, such as the one-year
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) deadline, means that a
court will pause (or "toll") the running of the limitations period for equitable reasons. The
Supreme Court held in Holland v. Florida that unlike certain statutory limitations periods,
such as the limitations period for tax refund claims at issue in a previous case, the AEDPA
one-year limitations period was subject to equitable tolling in part because "'equitable
principles' have traditionally 'governed' the substantive law of habeas corpus." Holland, 130
S. Ct. at 2561 (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (20o8)).
95. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214. The one-year limitations period for state prisoners is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 224 4 (d) (i)
(2006) ("A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court."). The statute of
limitations for federal prisoners is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Before the adoption of
AEDPA, neither Congress nor the judiciary had ever imposed a deadline on the filing of
habeas corpus petitions. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 214 (2oo6) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "prior to the enactment of AEDPA," the Court had rejected
imposing a time bar on federal habeas petitions due to "habeas courts' traditionally broad
discretionary powers"); Lisa L. Bellamy, Playing for Time: The Need for Equitable Tolling of
the Habeas Corpus Statute ofLimitations, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 12 (2004).
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whether they could use their equitable powers to "toll" this deadline when
attorney error caused petitioners to file untimely petitions, notwithstanding
Coleman. The courts split not only with regard to their answer to that question,
but also with regard to the reasoning they employed to justify their holdings. A
majority of the circuits, including the Third,9' Fifth,97 Eighth,9' Ninth,99 and
Tentho Circuit Courts of Appeals, employed performance-based analysis to
distinguish between "ordinary" attorney negligence chargeable to the client
and "extraordinary" or "gross" negligence not chargeable to the client.
However, other judges relied on Coleman's relationship-based agency analysis
to support their determinations whether attorney error could be grounds for
equitably tolling the AEDPA deadline."o' I will first discuss the circuits that
used the relationship-based model and then contrast that approach with the
performance-based analysis that the majority of the circuits employed.
The Eleventh Circuit expressly relied on relationship-based agency
principles to toll the statute of limitations for death-row prisoner Ernest
Charles Downs, whose postconviction lawyers had lied to him regarding the
status of his state postconviction petition' and failed to file a timely federal
petition.0 3 The court noted that while the "your lawyer, your fault" approach
was consistent with agency-law principles,' the agency rule was not
absolute.0 5 "[U]nder fundamental tenets of agency law, a principal is not
charged with an agent's actions or knowledge when the agent is acting
adversely to the principal's interests.",,o6 In this case, because Downs's lawyers
were thwarting his efforts to file a timely habeas petition and "working against
his interests at every turn,""' it was improper to bind him to their conduct. In
96. Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310 ( 3d Cir. 2001).
97. United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 2002).
98. United States v. Martin, 408 F.3 d 1o89 (8th Cir. 2005).
9g. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3 d 796 (9 th Cir. 2003)-
oo. Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249 (ioth Cir. 2007).
1o1. I do not claim in this Note that courts evaluating attorney misconduct rely on one model
exclusively. These descriptive categories are my attempt to delineate broadly the two main
modes of analysis that courts use, but there are examples in which courts blend
performance-based and relationship-based analysis.
102. Downs v. McNeil, 520 F. 3 d 1311, 1314 (n1th Cir. 2008).
103. Id. at 1316.
104. Id. at 1320.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1322.
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Baldayaque v. United States, Chief Judge Jacobs's concurrence also used agency
principles to conclude that the client should not be bound by the attorney's
failure to file a federal habeas petition."o However, the Seventh Circuit relied
on Coleman's hard-line application of agency principles to hold that "attorney
misconduct, whether labeled negligent, grossly negligent, or willfil, is
attributable to the client."o 9
In one case, the lawyer waited until June 25, 1999, to mail a federal habeas
petition to the district court."'0 The deadline was June 28, 1999, and the district
court received and filed the petition on June 29."' The judge dismissed the
petition as untimely."' Judge Easterbrook wrote:
No one interfered with Johnson's ability to pursue collateral relief in a
timely fashion. He wants us to treat his own lawyer as the source of
interference, but lawyers are agents. Their acts (good and bad alike) are
attributed to the client's they represent. . . . So it is as if Johnson
himself had made the decisions that led to the delay."'
108. 338 F.3 d 145, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, C.J., concurring). Heriberto Baldayaque was
convicted of a drug offense and sentenced to a term of 168 months' imprisonment. Id. at 147
(majority opinion). He asked his wife to hire an attorney to file a "2255" (i.e., a petition for
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006)). See 338 F.3d at 148 (majority opinion).
His wife hired Burton Weinstein and paid him $5,000 to represent Baldayaque. Weinstein
incorrectly told her that it was too late to file a "2255," but he did file a cursory motion for
modification of Baldayaque's sentence. Id. at 148-49. Once that motion was denied,
Weinstein informed Baldayaque's wife that there was nothing more he could do. Id. at 149.
By this point, the one-year deadline for filing a federal habeas petition had passed. Id. While
the majority held that Weinstein's incompetent behavior constituted a sufficiently
"extraordinary" circumstance to justify equitable tolling of the one-year AEDPA statute of
limitations, id. at 152-53, Chief Judge Jacobs's concurrence relied on agency principles,
arguing that the corollary to the general rule that clients are bound by the actions of their
lawyer-agents "is that when an 'agent acts in a manner completely adverse to the principal's
interest,' the 'principal is not charged with the agent's misdeeds,"' id. at 154 (Jacobs, C.J.,
concurring) (quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bonnanzio, 91 F. 3d 296, 303 (2d Cir.
1996)). This case demonstrates that different judges on the same panel can reach the same
result even as they rely on different models: the majority applied the performance-based
model and concluded that the lawyer's negligence was "extraordinary," while Chief Judge
Jacobs applied the relationship-based model and concluded that the lawyer's behavior
severed the attorney-client relationship.
og. Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3 d 965, 968 (7 th Cir. 2003).
11o. Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 588 (7th Cir. 2004).
iii. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 589-90 (citations omitted).
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In contrast with this relationship-based analysis, the Third, Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all relied on performance-based reasoning to hold
that attorney misconduct can be grounds to apply equitable tolling to the
AEDPA statute of limitations. It is important to note that many of these cases
involved indicia of a breakdown in the principal-agent relationship: deception
on the part of the lawyer, 14 failure to keep the client informed regarding
the status of the case,115 failure to follow specific client instructions," or
abandonment of the client."7 However, rather than relying on agency
principles as the Eleventh Circuit did, these courts reasoned that such
misconduct on the part of the lawyers constituted "egregious" negligence
warranting equitable tolling."8
The Eighth Circuit case of United States v. Martin is instructive." 9 The
court noted that the lawyer "consistently misled" the client and his wife,
including by lying about filing a § 2255 petition on the client's behalf 2 o The
lawyer also did not return any of the forty phone calls placed by the client's
wife and did not show up to two appointments with the client's wife."' The
court stated that the lawyer's conduct was "the type of egregious attorney
misconduct that may excuse an untimely filing.""' However, as Chief Judge
Jacobs argued in his Baldayaque v. United States concurrence, a more
analytically sound basis for the court's decision may have been to hold that the
114. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the client
was "deceived by his attorney into believing that a timely § 2255 motion had been filed on
his behalf").
115. See, e.g., Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 8oi ( 9 th Cir. 2003) (noting that although the client
and his mother tried contacting the attorney numerous times by telephone and in writing,
"these efforts proved fruitless," as the attorney failed to file the petition and furthermore
failed to return the client's case file to the client).
116. See, e.g., Fleming v. Evans, 481 F. 3 d 1249, 1255-57 (loth Cir. 2002) (observing that although
the client specifically instructed his attorney to withdraw his guilty plea and file an
application for postconviction relief, his attorney failed to do so and furthermore falsely
represented to the client that he had filed the application).
117. See, e.g., Nara v. Frank, 264 F. 3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Also troubling is Nara's
contention that his attorney . . . effectively abandoned him and prevented him from filing
the habeas petition on time.").
ii8. These courts distinguished "egregious" attorney misconduct from "ordinary attorney
negligence," which would not justify tolling the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Spitrsyn, 345
F.3 d at 800.
119. 4o8 F.3 d 1089 (8th Cir. 2005).
120. Id. at 1094.
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lawyer's failure to communicate with his client or file any documents on his
client's behalf meant that the lawyer had effectively stopped functioning as the
client's agent.' That approach would have been more consistent with the
Coleman Court's reliance on agency principles. That approach would have been
more consistent with the Coleman Court's reliance on agency principles, as the
Eighth Circuit could have examined the nature of the relationship between the
lawyer and his client as opposed to attempting to draw a line between
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" attorney misconduct.
B. Negligent Lauyers Reach the Supreme Court
In recent Terms, the Supreme Court has issued three opinions addressing
the core question of this Note: Under what circumstances can petitioners
escape the consequences of their postconviction or habeas attorneys'
misconduct? This Section describes how the Court's analysis of this issue has
vacillated between using the performance-based and relationship-based
models.
The first case of the Supreme Court's recent "bad lawyers" trio, Holland v.
Florida, " involved the same issue that had split the lower courts: whether
attorney misconduct could be grounds for equitable tolling of the AEDPA
statute of limitations. The Court joined the majority of the circuits and held
that attorney misconduct could be grounds for equitable tolling, but it relied on
vague performance-based reasoning that provided little guidance to lower
courts and failed to satisfactorily distinguish this holding from the hard-line
rule in Coleman that attorney negligence in the postconviction context is always
chargeable to the client.
Holland involved a death-row inmate, Albert Holland, who received a
state-appointed attorney to represent him in state and federal postconviction
proceedings."'s The clock on Holland's one-year window to file a federal
petition began running on October l, 2001.26 After Holland's attorney, Bradley
Collins, was appointed, he waited 316 days to file a motion for postconviction
123. 338 F.3d 145, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, C.J., concurring) ("I am reluctant to create a
distinction between malpractice that is extraordinary and malpractice that is not. I think that
principles of agency law furnish a superior basis for distinguishing [a prior] case.").
124. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
125. Id. at 2555.
126. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) (2oo6) (establishing a one-year window for filing a federal
habeas petition and providing that this deadline will be tolled during the pendency of state
post-conviction relief proceedings).
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relief in the state's trial court."' This petition stopped the clock on Holland's
AEDPA deadline with twelve days to go."' Over the course of the next few
years, "Holland wrote Collins letters asking him to make certain that all of his
claims would be preserved for any subsequent federal habeas corpus review.""'
Once the state trial court denied Holland's state postconviction petition,
Collins appealed the denial to the Florida Supreme Court.' While his case was
pending in the Florida Supreme Court, Holland became unhappy with
Collins's lack of communication and twice wrote to the Florida Supreme Court
asking to remove Collins from his case."' The Florida Supreme Court held that
Holland could not file any pro se papers with the court while he was
represented by counsel, including papers requesting new counsel."'
Collins argued Holland's case before the Florida Supreme Court on
February 1o, 2005, and that court published its decision denying Holland relief
on November 1o, 2005." Mandate issued on December 1, 2005, at which point
the AEDPA federal habeas clock began to run.34 The one-year limit expired on
December 13, 2005, unbeknownst to Collins, who was unaware that a decision
had been rendered.s3 1 During this period, Holland frequently wrote to Collins
requesting status updates on his case, but Collins never replied, and Holland
did not learn that the Florida Supreme Court had issued its decision until
January 18, 2006. 36 He immediately wrote out his own pro se federal habeas
petition and mailed it to the federal district court the next day, but that court
dismissed his petition as untimely because he filed it approximately five weeks
after the expiration of his AEDPA window."
On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court held that a
petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 224 4(d) if he can
"show[] '(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing."* It





132. Id. at 2556.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2556-57.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2557, 2559.
138. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (emphasis omitted)).
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further held that in Holland's case, the "extraordinary circumstances" involved
his "attorney's failure to satisfy professional standards of care."' The Court
supported its holding in part by reference to the lower court decisions that had
distinguished between "garden variety" or "excusable" attorney negligence and
"egregious" negligence sufficient to be an "extraordinary circumstance"
justifying equitable tolling. 4o The Court also relied on an amicus brief filed by
legal ethics professors, which argued that Collins had "violated fundamental
canons of professional responsibility" set forth in case law, the Restatements of
Agency, and the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 4 '
A few things are worth noting about the Holland decision. First, the Court's
attempt to distinguish Coleman (i.e., to explain why attorney misconduct could
constitute "extraordinary circumstances" sufficient to justify equitable tolling,
but not "cause" sufficient to justify state procedural defaults) was cursory and
unsatisfying. The Court stated, "[I]n the context of procedural default, we
have previously stated, without qualification, that a petitioner 'must bear the
risk of attorney error.""4 However, the Court distinguished Coleman as being
a "case about federalism" and the deference that federal courts owe to a state
court's determination that its own procedural rules had been violated, while
Holland and the equitable-tolling analysis concerned federal courts' ability to
excuse a petitioner's failure to comply with federal procedural rules.'43 Second,
the Court failed to articulate a clear theory for when attorney misconduct
would be severe enough to qualify as extraordinary circumstances,4 referring
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2563-64.
141. Id. at 2564-65.
142. Id. at 2563 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991)).
143. Id. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Coleman majority began, "This is a case about
federalism. It concerns the respect that federal courts owe the States and the States'
procedural rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners in federal habeas corpus." 5o
U.S. at 726.
144. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2575 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The only thing the Court offers that
approaches substantive instruction is its implicit approval of 'fundamental canons of
professional responsibility' .... (quoting id. at 2564-65 (majority opinion))). The majority
opinion had stated, "A group of teachers of legal ethics tells us that [Collins's] various
failures violated fundamental canons of professional responsibility, which require attorneys
to perform reasonably competent legal work, to communicate with their clients, to
implement clients' reasonable requests, to keep their clients informed of key developments
in their cases, and never to abandon a client." Id. at 2564 (majority opinion) (citing Brief for
Legal Ethics Professors et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Holland, 130 S. Ct.
2549 (No. 09-5327), 2009 WL 5177143)).
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instead to "fundamental canons of professional responsibility" 45 and the
various circuit court decisions that had attempted to parse the distinction
between ordinary and gross attorney negligence.
Justice Alito, in concurrence, criticized the majority opinion's impractical
distinction between ordinary and gross negligence, arguing that the line
between the two "would be hard to administer" and "would almost certainly
yield inconsistent and often unsatisfying results."146 He argued that the
question instead should turn on whether the missed deadline results from
attorney misconduct that is not "constructively attributable""'4 to the client. In
this case, because Collins effectively "abandoned" his client, common sense and
agency principles dictated that Holland should not be charged with the
conduct of an attorney who was "not operating as his agent in any meaningful
sense of that word."148
In the next case to reach the Court on this issue, Maples v. Thomas,'4 9 the
majority opinion adopted Justice Alito's agency analysis to explain why Cory
Maples's procedural default should have been excused after his attorneys
abandoned his case. Maples is an Alabama death-row inmate whose state
postconviction petition was written by two Sullivan & Cromwell associates
serving pro bono.so While the petition was pending, the two associates left the
firm without notifying Maples or seeking the Alabama court's leave to
withdraw as counsel."s' The Alabama trial court denied Maples's petition in
May 2003, and its clerk's office mailed notice of the ruling to Sullivan &
Cromwell's New York office.'5 ' These notices were returned unopened, and,
with no attorney acting on his behalf, Maples's deadline to appeal the state trial
court's denial of his petition expired.'
Ordinarily, Maples's failure to appeal would be a state procedural default,
barring his ability to petition for federal habeas relief. However, the Supreme
Court held that "under agency principles, a client cannot be charged with the
acts or omissions of an attorney who has abandoned him."' 4 The Court
14S. Id. at 2564.
146. Id. at 2567-68 (Alito, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 2568.
148. Id.
149. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
iso. Id. at 918.
151. Id. at 919.
152. Id. at 919-20.
153. Id. at 920.
154. Id. at 924.
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claimed that it did not "disturb [Coleman's] general rule" that a petitioner is
bound by the mistake of his or her postconviction attorney who misses a filing
deadline and cannot use the lawyer's negligent conduct as cause to excuse the
state procedural default."ss No matter how egregious a postconviction
attorney's error, a client is bound by the lawyer's conduct unless the attorney
has essentially abandoned the client and therefore "severed the principal-agent
relationship. ,,is6 The Court's decision therefore definitively established an
"abandonment" exception to the agency theory of postconviction
representation and recast Holland as a decision turning on the lawyer's
"abandonment" of his client rather than his egregious negligence.'1s
However, in the final case in this trio, Martinez v. Ryan,"' the Court again
applied a performance-based standard to attorney misconduct in the
postconviction context. The defendant, Luis Mariano Martinez, was convicted
of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor.' 9 Arizona law prohibits
defendants from arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel on
direct appeal, 6 o instead requiring them to present these claims during state
collateral proceedings."' The attorney appointed to represent Martinez
on direct and collateral review began the state collateral proceeding by filing
a notice of postconviction relief, but ultimately failed to present
an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim during the collateral
proceedings.'"' The state trial court gave Martinez forty-five days to file his
own petition for collateral relief, but Martinez failed to do so, and the court
dismissed the action for postconviction relief.' He later claimed that he was
unaware of the ongoing proceedings and that his attorney had never told him
that he needed to file a pro se petition to preserve his claims.' 6  Later, while
155. Id. at 922.
156. Id. at 922-23.
157. Id. at 923 ("Justice Alito homed in on the essential difference between a claim of attorney
error, however egregious, and a claim that an attorney had essentially abandoned his client.
Holland's plea fit the latter category . . . " (citation omitted)).
158. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
15g. Id. at 1313.
160. Id. at 1314 (quoting State v. Spreitz, 39 P. 3d 525, 527 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc)).
161. Id.
162. Id. Martinez's attorney ended up filing a statement claiming she could not find any colorable
claims for relief. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. Martinez's brief actually explains the course of events as follows: the attorney sent
Martinez a letter explaining that he needed to file his own petition, but the letter was
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represented by new counsel, Martinez attempted to present his ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a second collateral proceeding.' The state
court dismissed his petition in part because of a state procedural rule
precluding relief on claims that could have been raised in a previous collateral
proceeding. 66
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court could have
proceeded in a few different ways. First, the Court could have answered the
question presented in the petition for certiorari -whether defendants who are
prohibited by state law from raising a particular claim on direct appeal have a
federal constitutional right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel
with respect to that particular claiml67 -in the affirmative. Coleman had noted
that many states required defendants to reserve certain claims, such as
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, for collateral proceedings, making these
proceedings the "one and only appeal" as to these claims.1 Coleman had
therefore reserved the question of whether petitioners may have a
constitutional right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel for claims
that can be raised for the first time during postconviction proceedings,
notwithstanding the general rule of no constitutional right to counsel during
collateral review.16 9 The Court faced this constitutional question squarely in
Martinez and blinked, stating that "[t] his is not the case ... to resolve whether
[the right to counsel in this context] exists as a constitutional matter."1 70
The Court also could have relied on the relationship-based approach
espoused in Maples to hold that Martinez's attorney had effectively abandoned
him by failing to file a substantive petition for collateral relief and to
communicate with him in Spanish regarding the status of his case and the need
for him to file a pro se petition to preserve his claims. Instead, the Court held
that, even though it had not held that the right to postconviction counsel
existed for this class of claims as a constitutional matter, "[i]nadequate
written in English, even though the attorney knew that Martinez did not speak any English.
Brief for Petitioner at 7, Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 1o-1oo1), 2011 WL 3467246, at *7,
i6. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
166. Id.
167. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 1o-1oo1), 2011 WL
398287, at *i.
168. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756 (1991)).
169. Id. The rationale for constitutionalizing the right to counsel during collateral proceedings as
to claims for which the collateral proceeding is effectively the first appeal of right is based on
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963), which requires states to appoint counsel for
defendants' first appeal of right.
170. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
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assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause
for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial."17'
The opinion therefore granted state postconviction petitioners a remedy for
ineffective assistance of counsel without explicitly recognizing a constitutional
right to counsel at this stage."'7 Most importantly for the purposes of this
analysis, the Court imposed the performance-based Strickland standard on
attorney conduct during initial collateral-review proceedings of ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims.173 The Court's reasoning for imposing the
performance-based standard, even in a context where it refused to hold that the
constitutional right to counsel applied, was based largely on two factors:
(i) the fundamental importance of the right to trial counsel and (2) the state's
decision to bar defendants from raising ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claims on direct appeal.'74
C. The Law Governing Postconviction Counsel After Maples and Martinez
Is there any way to harmonize Maples's relationship-based approach with
Martinez's imposition of a performance-based standard? Justice Kennedy
presents Martinez as a limited qualification to Coleman's holding that attorney
"ignorance or inadvertence . .. does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural
default."s17  Yet Martinez, unlike Maples,176 is not situated within Coleman's
relationship-based agency rationale. The Martinez opinion emphasized that
"the limited nature of the qualification to Coleman adopted here reflects the
importance of the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel and Arizona's
decision to bar defendants from raising ineffective-assistance claims on direct
171. Id.
172. See Steve Vladeck, Opinion Analysis: A New Remedy, but No Right, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 21,
2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p= 14118o.
173. Martinez, 132 S. Ct at 1318 (asserting that to overcome a default of an ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claim when the state requires the defendant to raise that claim in a collateral
proceeding, the defendant must prove that "appointed counsel in the initial-review collateral
proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, was ineffective under the standards of
Strickland v. Washington").
174. Id. at 1320.
175. Id. at 1315.
176. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922-23 (2012) (stating that while the Court did not
"disturb that general rule" from Coleman that a petitioner is bound by his attorney-agent's
failure to meet a filing deadline, "[a] markedly different situation is presented ... when an
attorney abandons his client without notice," thereby severing the principal-agent
relationship).
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appeal."'77 This caveat represents a clue to how the Martinez exception may
evolve over time. It is possible that the Court will acknowledge in future cases
that there are other important substantive claims for which postconviction
proceedings serve as the first level of review, such as claims that the
prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,",8
or claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel."' If so, then it is
possible that the Court will apply the Strickland performance-based model to
habeas petitioners' claims that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel
provides cause to excuse procedural default of other substantive constitutional
claims.
The best reading of Martinez is therefore that a performance-based
standard will apply to postconviction attorneys' conduct with respect to claims
that meet the following two criteria: they concern a constitutional right that
the Court determines is as fundamentally important as the right to trial
counsel, and they are claims that the state requires defendant to present for the
first time at an initial-review collateral proceeding. In all other circumstances,
the Maples relationship-based "abandonment" standard will apply. This means
that as long as an examination of the relationship between the attorney and the
client demonstrates the continued existence of a principal-agent relationship,
all of the attorney's acts and omissions will be charged to the client, even if the
attorney's conduct is so negligent that it would violate the Strickland
performance standard if that standard were applicable. It remains an open
question which case, Martinez or Maples, will prove more helpful to habeas
petitioners. Perhaps courts will expand the scope of Martinez by finding that its
performance-based approach applies to a significant number of substantive
claims beyond ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. It is also possible
that Maples will prove to be a significant gateway if courts adopt a flexible
approach to evaluating claims of attorney "abandonment." The next Part
explores how such a flexible approach could work, using principles drawn from
177. 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
178. 373 U.S. 83 (1963)-
179. This point is borrowed from Justice Scalia's insightful dissenting opinion in Martinez,
although I do not share his dismay at the thought of future courts broadening the scope
of the Martinez exception. See 132 S.Ct. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one
really believes that the newly announced 'equitable' rule will remain limited to
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel cases. There is not a dime's worth of difference in
principle between those cases and many other cases in which initial state habeas will be the
first opportunity for a particular claim to be raised: claims of 'newly discovered'
prosecutorial misconduct, ... claims based on 'newly discovered' exculpatory evidence or
'newly discovered' impeachment of prosecutorial witnesses, and claims asserting ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.").
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cases examining claims of attorney abandonment in the context of civil
litigation.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP-BASED MODEL
This Part compares the analytic foundations of the relationship-based and
performance-based models and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
each. Given the Maples Court's affirmation of Coleman's relationship-based
standard, it is important to examine the extent to which this model offers
substantive protection to habeas petitioners. I argue that while the
performance-based model provides more robust protections for habeas
petitioners, the Court's recent reaffirmation of the relationship-based model in
Maples signals that this is the model that will continue to govern the majority
of petitioners, notwithstanding the narrow Martinez exception. I further argue
that civil cases, such as the ones from which the Coleman Court borrowed its
agency analysis in the first place, provide federal habeas courts with helpful
analytic aids. This body of civil cases concerning lawyer misconduct
evinces a much more flexible approach to the relationship-based model, and
should be used as guidance by federal habeas courts seeking to apply the
relationship-based model to ensure that habeas petitioners do not forfeit
potentially meritorious constitutional claims because of the misconduct of their
postconviction counsel.
A. A Normative Analysis of the Relationship-Based Model
The Coleman Court relied primarily on two previous cases arising in the
civil litigation context for the proposition that in a system of "representative
litigation" each party is deemed bound by the act of his "lawyer-agent""so: Link
v. Wabash Railroad Co.'8' and Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs.s' These
cases can therefore aid federal habeas courts in fleshing out the analytic
foundation of the relationship-based model. In particular, courts considering
18o. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) ("Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not
'cause' because the attorney is the petitioner's agent when acting, or failing to act, in
furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must 'bear the risk of attorney error.'
(quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)) (citing Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 92 (1990); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962)).
181. 370 U.S. 626.
182. 498 U.S. 89. Because Irwin relied on Link's reasoning and did not expand on Link's agency
theory of representative litigation, my analysis will focus on Link.
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Maples claims should be guided by factors the post-Link cases have utilized to
determine when a "lawyer-agent" has abandoned his or her client.
William Link filed suit against the railroad company for injuries sustained
after a collision with one of the company's trains.' Six years after the
complaint was filed, the district court judge scheduled a pretrial conference for
the afternoon of October 12, 1960, in Hammond, Indiana. 8, On the morning
of October 12, Link's attorney telephoned the judge from another courthouse in
Indianapolis (16o miles away from Hammond) and explained that he was busy
filing papers in the Indiana Supreme Court and would not be able to make the
pretrial conference unless it was rescheduled for the following day. 18 After the
attorney failed to appear at the conference, the district court judge dismissed
the action for failure to prosecute the case. 186 The Supreme Court upheld the
dismissal, rejected the argument that dismissing the claim because of the
attorney's conduct imposed an unfair penalty on the client, and articulated the
following view of the attorney-client relationship:
Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the
action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or
omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly
inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each
187party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent ....
For the Link Court, the fact that the client had voluntarily chosen his
lawyer was an essential underpinning of the lawyer-as-agent relationship
model. This critical factor is simply absent from our system of appointing
postconviction counsel. Adam Liptak has noted that "clients and lawyers fit the
agency model imperfectly [because a]gency law is built on the concepts of free
choice, consent, and loyalty, and it is not unusual to find lawyer-client
relationships in which some or all of these elements are missing.",,8 In a
post-Maples equitable-tolling case, Judge Barkett of the Eleventh Circuit also
criticized the "continued application to death-row inmates of the agency theory
of the lawyer-client relationship," arguing that "none of the key assumptions
183. Link, 370 U.S. at 627.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 627-28.
186. Id. at 629; cf FED. R. CIV. P. 4 1(b) ("If the plaintiff fails to prosecute ... a defendant may
move to dismiss the action.").
187. Link, 370 U.S at 633-34 (emphasis added).
188. Adam Liptak, Foreword: Agency and Equity: Why Do We Blame Clients for Their Lawyers'
Mistakes?, 110 MICH. L. REV. 875, 875 (2012).
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underlying the application of an agency relationship to a death-sentenced client
and his lawyer are valid in the post-conviction context."'" In particular, she
pointed to a death-row inmate's inability to choose his own lawyer or to
supervise and communicate with his lawyer as factors that undercut the
applicability of the agency model.' 90
It is important to question the legal fiction underlying the application of
the agency model to postconviction lawyers and their clients because as a result
this model, clients are generally required to "bear the risk"'' of their attorneys'
errors. These errors can result in a client losing his or her chance to present
viable constitutional claims to federal habeas courts. While the Court has
recognized some limitations to the Coleman principle that clients must be
charged with all of the acts and omissions of their lawyer-agents, a narrow
interpretation of the "abandonment" exception outlined in Maples runs the risk
of benefiting only a small class of inmates whose lawyers completely abandon
them, and leaving unprotected inmates such as the ones discussed in the
Introduction, whose lawyers filed woefully inadequate'92 or untimely' habeas
petitions. A strict application of this exception may even create a "perverse
incentive" for attorneys "to abandon their clients' cases, rather than attempt to
better understand the law and risk the chance of filing the petitions late." 94
While it is the case that a performance-based standard operates across the
board to police the conduct and efforts of all lawyers, as opposed to only those
who abandon their clients, the potential of the relationship-based model
should not be discounted. In order to see how a flexible relationship-based
model can operate to protect defendants in the postconviction context, it is
helpful to return to the civil litigation context. As previously discussed, the
189. Hutchinson v. Florida, 677 F.3d 1097, 1104 (i1th Cir. 2012) (Barkett, J., concurring in the
judgment).
190. Id. at 1105; cf Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 114 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[N]o
fictional relationship of principal-agent or the like can justify holding the criminal defendant
accountable for the naked errors of his attorney. This is especially true when so many
indigent defendants are without any realistic choice in selecting who ultimately represents
them at trial." (footnote omitted)); Dunphy v. McKee, 134 F.3 d 1297, 1300 (7 th Cir. 1998)
(noting the limitations of the agency theory "under circumstances in which the client had no
voice in choosing the lawyer").
191. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
192. See supra note i and accompanying text (discussing inmate Ricky Kerr, whose lawyer filed a
three-page habeas petition).
193. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
194. Marni von Wilpert, Comment, Holland v. Florida: A Prisoner's Last Chance, Attorney Error,
and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's One-Year Statute of Limitations Period for
Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 1429, 1467 (2010).
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Coleman Court borrowed the lawyer-agent relationship model from Link, a civil
case. However, the Court failed to acknowledge that by the time Coleman was
decided, subsequent decisions had loosened Link's mechanical rule that clients
are bound by their lawyers' conduct, with most circuit courts agreeing that in
the context of civil litigation, judges may use their equitable powers to unbind
clients from their lawyer-agents' acts or omissions. The next Section explores
these cases and argues that these cases should serve as interpretive aids for
federal habeas courts trying to apply the relationship-based standard. In
particular, I argue that they demonstrate extremely flexible applications of the
relationship-based model. Federal habeas courts should adopt the same flexible
approach to provide substantive protection from negligent postconviction
lawyers.
B. Post-Link Applications of the Relationship-Based Model
The Link rule was contested at the time it was adopted. In dissent, Justice
Black argued that agency principles were not enough to justify a
"mechanical rule" that clients must always be punished for the conduct of their
lawyers - and that this case, in which a severely injured man was barred forever
from seeking compensation for his injuries, was "a good illustration of the
deplorable kind of injustice" that could result from adopting such a rule."'
Subsequent courts have in fact injected flexibility into the Supreme Court's
"mechanical rule." Their instrument for doing so has been Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6o(b), which allows a court to "relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding,"9 6 such as an order
dismissing an action for failure to prosecute under Rule 4 1(b). Rule 60(b) has
been described as "a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a
particular case,"197 which enables courts "to vacate judgments whenever such
action is appropriate to accomplish justice."'9' While Rule 60(b) lists several
reasons for which judgments may be vacated, courts have relied on the catchall
provision of Rule 6o(b) (6) -relief may be granted for "any other reason that
justifies relief1 9 -to relieve clients from the consequences of their lawyers'
conduct.
195. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 645 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 6o(b).
197. Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) (quoting Menier
v. United States, 405 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1968)).
198. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 6oi, 615 (1949).
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 6o(b)(6).
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Many circuits have held that, notwithstanding Link,2 oo courts may use Rule
6o(b)(6) to award relief to clients for their lawyers' misconduct.o' While each
determination of whether relief is warranted under Rule 6o(b)(6) is necessarily
very fact intensive, certain principles may be drawn from the cases in which the
plaintiff successfully secured relief. Federal habeas courts should keep these
principles in mind when applying the relationship-based model to Maples
claims: (1) courts focused on the communication between lawyers and clients,
with several cases involving lawyers who actively misled their clients or failed
to communicate with their clients at all; (2) courts weighed the harm to the
plaintiff from dismissal against the prejudice that would be suffered by the
defendant by reopening the case; and (3) courts found that clients were
"abandoned" when they received virtually no representation, even if the
attorney continued to function officially as the attorney of record.
1. Communication
Evidence regarding the communication between a lawyer and his client is
often crucial, with courts looking particularly sympathetically on clients whose
lawyers actively deceived them. For example, Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co.
2oo. The Link Court had itself noted that Rule 6o(b) provided a "corrective remedy" allowing for
the "reopening of cases in which final orders have been inadvisedly entered," but that the
petitioner had never sought to avail himself of that "escape hatch." 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962).
201. See Lal v. California, 610 F. 3d 518 ( 9th Cir. 2010); Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3 d
1164 ( 9th Cir. 2002); Boughner v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977-78
(3d Cir. 1978) (awarding relief in a circumstance when the particular lawyer had failed to file
responsive pleadings in fifty-two separate cases, and noting "[t]his egregious conduct
amounted to nothing short of leaving his clients unrepresented"); Jackson v. Wash.
Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1977); Vindigni v. Meyer, 441 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1971); L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews,
329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Primbs v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 366, 370 (1984) ("The
usual understanding of the attorney-client agency relationship, however, should not bar
relief under Rule 6o(b) when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not
acting as one."). Notably, the Seventh Circuit has maintained a hard-line approach to the
Link rule in the civil litigation context, just as it had maintained a hard-line approach to
Coleman's rule in the equitable tolling context. See Dickerson v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F-3d 1114,
18 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]his court has recently held that counsel's negligence, whether
gross or otherwise, is never a ground for Rule 6o(b) relief."); supra notes og-no and
accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's equitable-tolling decisions). The
Eighth Circuit has also held that "ordinary" attorney misconduct cannot form the basis for
relief under Rule 6o(b)(6). See Heim v. Comm'r, 872 F.2d 245, 247 (8th Cir. 1989) ("We
have 'generally held that neither ignorance nor carelessness on the part of an attorney will
provide grounds for 60(b) relief."' (quoting United States v. Thompson, 438 F.2d 254 (8th
Cit. 1971))).
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involved a lawyer who, when instructed by the district court to file a pretrial
status report within thirty days, failed to do so.202 The district court then
dismissed the case with prejudice.o 3 Even though the client had repeatedly
asked his lawyer about the progress of the case,2 o4 the lawyer failed to tell the
client about the dismissal and may have "misled the client by reassuring him
that the litigation was continuing smoothly when in fact it was suffering
severely from lack of attention."20 s The D.C. Circuit noted that "so serious a
dereliction by an attorney" could be grounds for relief under Rule 6o(b)(6)
and remanded the case to the district court to afford the client an opportunity
to apply for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).2o6 Several other civil cases involved
similar fact patterns.20 7
Federal courts sitting in habeas should follow suit and examine the nature
of the communication between the lawyer and habeas petitioner as one facet of
the relationship-based inquiry. A breakdown in communication can be one
strong signal that the principal-agent relationship has collapsed. Evidence that
the lawyer has avoided his or her client, failed to respond to direct inquiries
from his or her client, or has deceived his or her client outright should weigh
heavily in favor of finding attorney abandonment. Take the Holland case:
Albert Holland had written to the Florida Supreme Court asking for a new
lawyer because he was "unhappy with [the] lack of communication"zos
between himself and his lawyer, and despite Holland's frequent entreaties, his
lawyer failed to keep him informed regarding the status of his case. Other
202. 569 F.2d at 120.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 122 n.16.
205. Id. at 122.
zo6. Id. at 122-23.
207. See, e.g., Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
attorneys "represented to Tani that the litigation was proceeding smoothly," and that Tani
relied on his attorneys' assurances until "he received the order for default judgment"); L.P.
Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (noting that the client "made
numerous inquiries of his former counsel who refused to answer such inquiries and assured
appellee from time to time that the case was proceeding," even though it had been dismissed
for failure to prosecute (internal quotation marks omitted)); Primbs v. United States, 4 Cl.
Ct. 366, 370 (1984) (noting that the "agency analysis is particularly inappropriate when the
plaintiff [as in this case] has proven that his diligent efforts to prosecute the suit were,
without his knowledge, thwarted by his attorney's deceptions and negligence").
208. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2555 (2010).
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habeas cases also demonstrate a clear lack of communication' or even
outright deception2"o on the part of the lawyer.
2. Weighing the Harm to the PlaintiffAgainst the Prejudice to the
Defendant
As the Third Circuit noted in Boughner v. Secretary of Health, Education,
& Welfare, the general purpose of Rule 6o "is to strike a proper balance
between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end
and that justice must be done.""' To that end, courts handling civil litigation
have weighed the consequences of dismissing a suit for lack of prosecution
against the prejudice that reopening the litigation would inflict upon the
defendant. Lal v. California' represents this sort of balancing. The plaintiffs
husband was shot and killed by two California Highway Patrol officers, and
she brought a tort suit against them on behalf of herself, her son, and her
husband's estate." The district court dismissed her suit for failure to prosecute
after her attorney failed to provide required disclosures and missed several case
management conferences. 14 The Ninth Circuit reopened her suit after
weighing the prejudice that would be suffered by the defendants (i.e., the
possibility that their memories of the event had significantly deteriorated due
to the lengthy delay) and deciding that this type of prejudice was not
significant enough to outweigh the equitable reasons for granting the Rule
60(b)(6) motion.21s In reinstating cases, other courts have emphasized the
209. See, e.g., Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 8ol (9th Cir. 2003) (involving a lawyer who failed
to answer numerous telephone calls and letters from the client and his mother).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 292 F- 3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the prisoner
alleged he had been "deceived by his attorney into believing that a timely 5 2255 motion had
been filed on his behalf').
211. 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978).
212. 61o F. 3d 518 ( 9th Cir. 2010).
213. Id. at 521.
214. Id. at 521-22.
215. Id. at 526-27; see also Jackson v. Wash. Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("We
in this circuit have held that so serious a dereliction by an attorney, when unaccompanied by
a similar default by the client, may furnish a basis for relief under Rule 6o(b)(6). That is the
more so where, as apparently here, little if any prejudice has befallen the other party to the
litigation." (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)).
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strict economic penalties facing defendants as a result of having their cases
dismissed."1
Courts applying Rule 6o(b)(6) in civil suits have been sympathetic to
clients facing monetary and other losses as a result of their attorneys'
negligence. Therefore, these courts have interpreted Rule 6o(b)(6) liberally in
order to avoid these harsh consequences. Federal courts hearing habeas cases
should keep in mind that the consequences facing habeas petitioners are far
harsher than mere financial costs. The procedural-default jurisprudence
operates to preclude a court from hearing a petitioner's potentially substantive
claim if his lawyer fails to present it at the proper juncture. Therefore, the
reasons for adopting a flexible approach to the relationship-based model in the
habeas context are even more compelling than the reasons for adopting a
flexible approach to this model in civil litigation.
3. Effective or Virtual Abandonment
Many of these cases also involved attorney behavior that courts have
deemed to be abandonment. For example, the attorney in Vindigni v. Meyer217
failed to respond to interrogatories, and the record showed that the attorney
"was no longer attending to his practice and had reportedly 'disappeared.'"..."
Because of the "complete disappearance" of the plaintiffs attorney, the court
granted the plaintiffs Rule 6o(b) motion to vacate the order of dismissal.
Another Second Circuit case involved an attorney who failed to file an
opposition to the government's motion for summary judgment against his
clients." 9 The court noted that the attorney was "allegedly suffering from a
psychological disorder which led him to neglect almost completely his clients'
business while at the same time assuring them that he was attending to it," and
this "constructive disappearance" of the attorney distinguished the case from
Link.22o
216. See, e.g., Cmry. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that
Tani faced a two-million-dollar default judgment and the loss of the intangible business
benefit associated with the name of his dental practice); United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d
26, 35 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that reopening the case would allow the Ciramis to defend
themselves against a "severe financial blow").
217. 44 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1971). This case involved a suit by a longshoreman who claimed to
have sustained injuries while working aboard the defendant's vessel. Id. at 377.
218. Id.
219. Cirami, 563 F.2d at 29. Ciraini involved an action commenced by the government against the
Ciramis seeking to recover unpaid taxes. Id.
220. Id. at 34.
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Other courts have termed the failure of lawyers to meaningfully advocate
for their clients "virtual abandonment." For example, the Ninth Circuit in
Community Dental Services v. Tani noted that the attorney had "virtually
abandoned his client by failing to proceed with his client's defense despite
court orders to do so."' Such conduct that "results in the client's receiving
practically no representation at all," the court held, "clearly constitutes gross
negligence, and vitiat[es] the agency relationship that underlies our general
policy of attributing to the client the acts of his attorney.""' It is not necessary
for a lawyer to completely abandon the client in order to sever the agency
relationship. The attorney in Tani, for example, appeared on behalf of his client
at a preliminary case management conference and a hearing, but failed to
answer written motions filed by the plaintiff.' The plaintiffs attorney in
Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Center failed to answer the defendant's
interrogatories in a timely manner, but eventually filed a Rule 60(b) motion on
her client's behalf after the court dismissed the action because of her lateness.4
These cases demonstrate that there is a spectrum of attorney behavior that
will cause courts considering Rule 6o(b)(6) motions to conclude that the
lawyer has abandoned the client and severed the agency relationship. Federal
habeas courts should follow suit and not necessarily require abandonment as
obvious as that exhibited by Cory Maples's attorneys when they left Sullivan
& Cromwell to take jobs that precluded them from continuing their
representation of Maples.225 One theme running through a number of habeas
cases is a lawyer's failure to file a habeas petition despite a directive from the
client to do so.2 ' This fact pattern should weigh heavily in favor of finding that
the attorney has abandoned the client -a lawyer-agent's failure to follow an
express instruction from the principal-client is a strong indication that the
agency relationship has been vitiated.
221. 282 F.3 d at 1170.
222. Id. at 1171.
223. Id. at 1166-67 (describing the history of the litigation).
224. 804 F.2d 805, 8o6 (3d Cir. 1986).
225. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 924 (2012).
226. See, e.g., Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 358, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding "extraordinary
circumstances" warranting equitable tolling of the AEDPA deadline after the attorney "failed
to follow his client's instruction" to file a timely petition); Baldayaque v. United States, 338
F. 3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding "extraordinary circumstances" after the attorney failed
to file a federal habeas petition "[i]n spite of being specifically directed by his client's
representatives to file" one).
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C. Application ofRule 6o(b)(6) Principles to Habeas Cases
These cases provide federal courts with some standards for evaluating
whether postconviction counsel's negligence was such that the client was
effectively abandoned. The conceptual connection between the Rule 60(b)(6)
civil cases and habeas cases is strengthened by the fact that federal habeas
petitioners can use Rule 6o(b)(6) directly as an avenue for relief." The
Supreme Court confirmed in Gonzalez v. Crosby that habeas petitioners could
file motions for relief under Rule 6o(b)(6) to challenge the integrity of a
federal court's habeas proceedings."' In Gonzalez, the petitioner pleaded guilty
in a Florida state court to one count of robbery with a firearm." 9 In 1982, he
began serving a sentence of ninety-nine years.23 o Twelve years later, "he filed
two motions for state postconviction relief, which the Florida courts denied."'
In 1997, he filed a federal habeas petition, "alleging that his guilty plea had not
been entered knowingly and voluntarily.""' The district court dismissed the
petition as untimely under AEDPA's statute of limitations." In 2001, Gonzalez
filed a motion under Rule 6o(b)(6), contending that under recent Supreme
Court precedent, the district court had incorrectly determined that his petition
227. Even before the Court decided Gonzalez v. Crosby, the Second Circuit had held that "relief
under Rule 6o(b) is available for a previous habeas proceeding only when the Rule 6o(b)
motion attacks the integrity of the previous habeas proceeding rather than the underlying
criminal conviction." Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 2004). Harris also
articulated an abandonment standard almost eight years before the Court decided Maples:
[W]e hold that: an attack on the integrity of a previous habeas proceeding using
subsection (6) of Rule 60(b) is viable only in "extraordinary circumstances," and
that such circumstances will be particularly rare where the relief sought is
predicated on the alleged failures of counsel in a prior habeas petition. That is
because a habeas petitioner has no constitutional right to counsel in his habeas
proceeding and therefore, to be successful under Rule 6o(b)(6), must show more
than ineffectiveness under Strickland v. Washington. To obtain relief under Rule
6o(b)(6), a habeas petitioner must show that his lawyer abandoned the case and
prevented the client from being heard, either through counsel or pro se.
Id. (citations omitted).
228. 545 U.S. 524, 538 (2005).
229. Id. at 526.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 526-27.
233. Id. at 527.
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was time barred.M When his case reached the Supreme Court, the Court had
to decide whether this Rule 6o(b)(6) motion should be construed as a habeas
corpus petition; if it was, Gonzalez's motion would be barred by AEDPA's
prohibition on second or successive habeas petitions."s The Supreme Court
ultimately held that when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks the integrity of the
habeas proceedings, as opposed to "the substance of [a] federal court's
resolution of a claim on the merits," such a motion should not be treated as a
second or successive habeas petition."' It further noted, "Rule 60(b) has an
unquestionably valid role to play in habeas cases. The Rule is often used to
relieve parties from the effect of a default judgment mistakenly entered against
them, a function as legitimate in habeas cases as in run-of-the-mine civil
cases."
2 37
A recent case, Mackey v. Hoffman, illustrates the potential for application of
Rule 6o(b)(6) principles to a habeas petitioner's motion for relief under the
Rule."' Andrew Mackey was convicted of attempted murder in California state
court.239 LeRue Grim represented Mackey in his direct appeal and state
postconviction proceedings.4o In August 2007, Grim filed a timely federal
habeas petition, asserting that Mackey had been denied effective assistance of
counsel." The district court issued a routine order directing the state attorney
general to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus should not be granted,
which he did.' 2 However, Grim failed to file a traverse by the March 2008 due
date." In June 2008, Grim wrote Mackey, stating that Mackey's case was
before the federal court, that they were waiting for a trial date to be set, and
telling Mackey to ask his parents to pay his legal bill.' On July 13, 2009, the
234. Id. The state court had dismissed Gonzalez's second state postconviction proceeding as
procedurally barred. Id. The district court held that, as a result, AEDPA's statute of
limitations was not tolled during the 163-day period while Gonzalez's second state
postconviction petition was pending. Id. In 2000, the Supreme Court held "that an
application for state postconviction relief can be 'properly filed' even if the state courts
dismiss it as procedurally barred." Id. (quoting Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8-9 (2000)).
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 224 4(b) (2006).
236. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532, 538.
237. Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
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district court denied Mackey's habeas petition on the merits and entered
judgment against Mackey. 4 Although Grim received notification of the entry
of judgment, he failed to notify Mackey and did not file a notice of appeal.4'
Eight months after the entry of judgment, Mackey wrote a letter to the district
court inquiring about the status of his case." When he found out that his
petition had been denied, Mackey wrote to the district court again, stating that
his lawyer had told him that he had a court date coming and expressing
concern about his appellate rights."
In April 2010, Grim filed a declaration with the district court, stating that
although Mackey's parents had retained him for state postconviction
proceedings, they had not paid him in full for those services. 49 Grim claimed
that although he had prepared and filed the federal habeas petition pro bono,
he had informed his client that he would not handle further federal habeas
proceedings without receiving payments. 2 so The district court, although it
expressed concern about the "failure of communication" resulting in Mackey
being unaware that his petition had been denied, ruled that it did not have
authority pursuant to Rule 6o(b) to vacate its July 2009 judgment.2 s' On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied its holding in Community Dental Services v.
Tani-a conventional civil case-that gross negligence by counsel resulting in
"virtual[] abandon[ment]" could be an extraordinary circumstance justifying
relief under Rule 6o(b)(6)."5 It remanded to the district court to make a
finding as to whether Grim's acts and omissions constituted abandonment,
and if so, whether to grant Mackey relief pursuant to Rule 6o(b) (6).2s
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1248-49. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) requires litigants to file a Notice of
Appeal within thirty days of a judgment from which an appeal is taken. FED. R. APP. P. 4 (a).




251. Id. at 1250.
252. Id. at 1251 (alteration in original) (quoting Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F-3d 1164,
1169-71 (9 th Cir. 2002)).
253. Id. at 1254. On remand, the district court found that Mackey was abandoned by his lawyer
and therefore was eligible for relief under Rule 6o(b)(6). Mackey v. Hoffman, 2012 WL
4753512 at *1 (N.D.C.A. Oct. 4, 2012). The district court focused on the lack of
communication between Grim and Mackey, stating, "Mr. Grim did not keep petitioner
apprised of the status of this case, and most importantly, he failed to inform petitioner that
the petition had been denied and that judgment had been entered." Id.
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District courts facing claims such as the one described in Mackey should
apply the following principles derived from the relationship-based model.
First, examining the communication between the lawyer and client is key, and
evidence that a lawyer avoided responding to or actively deceived the client
should weigh heavily in favor of finding abandonment. Second, actual
abandonment of the sort exhibited by Maples's lawyers when they left their
law firm without notifying Maples is not required-courts applying Rule
6o(b)(6) in the civil litigation context have found virtual or constructive
abandonment in situations when lawyers have completed some work on the
client's case, but fail to complete a critical portion of the litigation process.
Third, evidence that a lawyer failed to follow an express directive from a client
also would be strong evidence that the lawyer abandoned the client. While the
abandonment inquiry will necessarily vary depending on the facts and
circumstances of each case, district courts should keep these principles in mind
when faced with claims under Maples.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent trio of "bad lawyer" decisions -Holland,
Maples, and Martinez - demonstrates how uncomfortable the Court has become
with the harsh consequences of binding habeas petitioners to the mistakes and
negligence of their attorneys. Without explicitly recognizing a right to effective
assistance of habeas counsel, the Court has attempted to carve out remedies for
petitioners after their lawyers' mistakes resulted in a procedural default of their
claims. This Note has outlined how lower courts moving forward should
borrow the flexible analysis employed in civil cases applying Rule 6o(b)(6) to
ensure that the Maples remedy serves as a viable remedy for habeas petitioners.
An overly strict application of the Maples attorney-abandonment exception to
agency principles would unfairly punish petitioners who have little choice in
selecting their attorneys, little ability to communicate with or supervise their
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Owen M. Fiss, B.A., B.Phil., LL.B., Sterling Professor Emeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
James Forman, Jr., A.B., J.D., Clinical Professor ofLaw
* Heather Gerken, A.B., JD.,]. Skelly Wright Professor ofLaw
Paul Gewirtz, A.B., J.D., Potter Stewart Professor ofConstitutional Law and Director, The China Center
Abbe R. Gluck, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor ofLaw
Robert W. Gordon, A.B., J.D., Chancellor Kent Professor Emeritus of Law and Legal History and Professor
(Adjunct) ofLaw (fall term)
Michael J. Graetz, B.B.A., LL.B.,Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor Emeritus of Law and Professorial Lecturer
in Law (fall term)
David Singh Grewal, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor ofLaw
Dieter Grimm, LL.M., Visiting Professor ofLaw and Gruber Global Constitutionalism Fellow (spring term)
Henry B. Hansmann, A.B., J.D., Ph.D., Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor ofLaw
Robert D. Harrison, J.D., Ph.D., Lecturer in Legal Method
Oona A. Hathaway, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., Gerard C. andBernice Latrobe Smith Professor ofInternational Law
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., B.A., J.D., Anne Urowsky Visiting Professor ofLaw
Edward J. Janger, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professor of Law (fall term)
Quintin Johnstone, A.B., J.D., LL.M., J.S.D., Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor Emeritus ofLaw
t Christine Jolls, BA., J.D., Ph.D., Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization
Dan M. Kahan, B.A., J.D., Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPsychology
* Paul W. Kahn, BA., Ph.D., J.D., Robert W. Winner Professor ofLaw and the Humanities and Director, Orville H.
Schell, Jr. Centerfor International Human Rights
Amy Kapczynski, A.B., M.Phil., M.A., J.D., Associate Professor ofLaw
S. Blair Kauffman, B.S., B.A., J.D., LL.M., M.L.L., Law Librarian and Professor ofLaw
Amalia D. Kessler, A.B., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., Sidley Austin-Robert D. McLean '7o Visiting Professor of Law (fall term)
Daniel J. Kevles, B.A., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (fall term)
t Alvin K. Klevorick, B.A., MA., Ph.D., John Thomas Smith Professor ofLaw and Professor ofEconomics
t Harold Hongju Koh, A.B., BA, J.D., M.A., Martin R. Flug 's5 Professor ofInternational Law
Anthony T. Kronman, B.A., Ph.D., J.D., Sterling Professor ofLaw
Douglas Kysar, BA., J.D., Deputy Dean and joseph M. Field 55 Professor ofLaw
John H. Langbein, A.B., LL.B., Ph.D., Sterling Professor ofLaw and Legal History
Justin Levitt, B.A., M.P.A., J.D., Visiting Associate Professor ofLaw (spring term)
James S. Liebman, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw
* Yair Listokin, A.B., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Professor ofLaw
Carroll L. Lucht, BA., M.S.W., J.D., Clinical Professor Emeritus of Law, SupervisingAttorney, and Professorial Lecturer
inLaw
t Jonathan R. Macey, A.B., J.D., Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities Law
Miguel Maduro, Dr.Jur., Visiting Professor of Law and Gruber Global Constitutionalism Fellow (fall term)
Chibli Mallat, L.L.B., L.L.M., Ph.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw and Oscar M. Ruebhausen Distinguished Senior Fellow
(fall term)
Joseph G. Manning, B.A., A.M., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (fall term)
David Marcus, B.A., J.D., Maurice R. Greenberg Visiting Professor ofLaw
Daniel Markovirs, B.A., M.Sc., B.Phil./D.Phil., J.D., Guido Calabresi Professor ofLaw
Jerry L. Mashaw, B.A., LL.B., Ph.D., Sterling Professor ofLaw (fall term)
Braxton McKee, M.D., Associate Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (fall tenn)
t Tracey L. Meares, B.S., J.D., Walton Hale Hamilton Professor ofLaw
Noah Messing, B.A., J.D., Lecturer in the Practice ofLaw and Legal Writing
Jeffrey A. Meyer, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw
Alice Miller, BA., J.D., Associate Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (spring term)
Nicholas Parrillo, A.B., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor ofLaw
Jean Kob Peters, B.A., J.D., Sol Goldman Clinical Professor ofLaw and SupervisingAttorney
Thomas Pogge, Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (spring term)
Robert C. Post, A.B., J.D., Ph.D., Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor ofLaw
J.L. Pottenger, Jr., A.B., J.D., Nathan Baker Clinical Professor ofLaw and Supervising Attorney
Claire Priest, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., Professor ofLaw
George L. Priest, B.A., J.D., Edward]. Phelps Professor ofLaw and Economics and Kauffmnan Distinguished Research
Scholar in Law, Economics, and Entrepreneurship
t W. Michael Reisman, LL.B., LL.M., J.S.D., Myres S. McDougal Professor ofInternational Law
t Judith Resnik, BA, J.D.,Arthur Liman ProfessorofLaw
4 Cristina Rodriguez, B.A., M.Litt., J.D., Professor ofLaw
* Roberta Romano, B.A., MA., J.D., Sterling Professor ofLaw and Director, Yale Law School Centerfor the Study of
Corporate Law
Carol M. Rose, BA, MA., Ph.D., J.D., Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor Emeritus ofLaw and Organization, and
Professorial Lecturer in Law
Susan Rose-Ackerman, BA., M.Phil., Ph.D., Henry R. Luce Professor ofjurisprudence, Law School and Department of
Political Science
Jed Rubenfeld, A.B., J.D., Robert R. Slaughter Professor ofLaw
Jennifer Prah Ruger, BA, MA., M.Sc., Ph.D., M.S.L., Associate Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (spring term)
William M. Sage, A.B., M.D., J.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
Peter H. Schuck, BA., J.D., LL.M., MA, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor Emeritus ofLaw and Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw
(fall term)
Vicki Schultz, B.A., J.D., Ford Foundation Professor ofLaw and Social Sciences
t Alan Schwartz, B.S., LL.B., Sterling Professor ofLaw
Ian Shapiro, B.Sc., M.Phil., Ph.D., J.D., Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (spring term)
t Scott J. Shapiro, BA., J.D., Ph.D., Charles F. Southmayd Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPhilosophy
Robert J. Shiller, B.A., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (spring term)
Reva Siegel, BA., M.Phil., J.D., Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor ofLaw
Norman I. Silber, BA., J.D., Ph.D., Visiting Professor ofLawv
James J. Silk, A.B., M.A., J.D., Clinical Professor ofLaw, Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, and
Executive Director, Orille H. Schell, Jr. Centerfor International Human Rights
John G. Simon, BA., LL.B., LL.D., Augustus E. Lines Professor Emeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
Robert A. Solomon, B.A., J.D., Clinical Professor Emeritus ofLaw
Richard Squire, BA., M.BA., J.D., Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor ofLaw
Stephanie M. Stern, B.A., J.D., Irving S. RibicoffVisiting Associate Professor ofLaw (fall term)
Richard B. Stewart, B.A., M.A., L.B., Visiting Professor ofLaw (fall term)
t Kate Stith, A.B., M.P.P., J.D., Lafayette S. Foster Professor ofLaw
Alec Stone Sweet, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Leitner Professor ofIntenational Law, Politics, and International Studies
Tom R. Tyler, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Macklin Fleming Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPsychology
Patrick Weil, B.A., M.B.A., Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Law (fall tern)
James Q. Whitman, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Ford Foundation Professor of Comparative and Foreign Law
Abraham L. Wickelgren, A.B., J.D., Ph.D., Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor ofLaw
Luzius Wildhaber, LL.M., J.S.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw and Gruber Global Constitutionalism Fellow (fall term)
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., B.A., LL.B., Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw
* Michael Wishnie, BA, J.D., William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor ofLaw and Director, Jerome N. Frank Legal Services
Organization
John Fabian Witt, BA., J.D., Ph.D., Allen H. Duffy Class of196o Professor ofLaw
Stephen Wizner, A.B., J.D., William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor Emeritus ofLaw, Supervising Attorney, and
Professorial Lecturer in Law
t Gideon Yaffe, A.B., Ph.D., Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPhilosophy
Howard V. Zonana, B.A., M.D., Professor ofPsychiatry and Clinical Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw
On leave of absence, 2012-2013.
t On leave of absence, fall term, 2012.
* On leave of absence, spring term, 2013.
LECTURERS IN LAW
Emily Bazelon, BA., J.D.
Cynthia Carr, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
Adam S. Cohen, A.B., J.D.
Linda Greenhouse, BA, M.S.L.
Adam Grogg, BA., M.Phil., J.D.
Lucas Guttentag, A.B., J.D.
Bruce J. Ho, B.A., M.E.M., J.D.
Jamie P. Horsley, BA, MA., J.D.
Margot E. Kaminski, B.A., J.D.
Katherine Kennedy, A.B., J.D.
Alex A. Knopp, B.A., J.D.
Annie Lai, BA., J.D.
John T. Marshall, B.A., M.A., J.D.
Hope R. Metcalf, B.A., J.D.
Christina M. Mulligan, B.A., J.D.
James E. Ponet, BA., MA., D.D.
Nina Rabin, BA., J.D.
Sia Sanneh, B.A., MA, J.D.
Daniel Wade, BA., MA, M.Div., MA., M.S., J.D.
VISITING LECTURERS IN LAW
Josh Abramowitz, BA, J.D.
Melinda Agsten, A.B., J.D.
Guillermo Aguilar-Alvarez, Lic. en Derecho (J.D.)
Richard Baxter, BA, MA., J.D.
H.E. Stuart Beck, BA., J.D.
Frank P. Blando, B.S., M.BA, J.D.
Stephen B. Bright, BA., J.D.
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, A.B., J.D.
Helen V. Cantwell, B.A., J.D.
Brett Cohen, B.A., J.D.
Timothy C. Collins, BA, M.BA.
Victoria Cundiff, BA, J.D.
Brian T. Daly, BA., M.A., J.D.
Karl "Tom" Dannenbaum, B.A., M.A., J.D.
Lisa Nachmias Davis, BA., J.D.
Francis X. Dineen, A.B., LL.B.
Stewart I. Edelstein, B.A., J.D.
Eugene R. Fidell, B.A., LL.B.
Gregory Fleming, B.A., J.D.
Lawrence Fox, B.A., J.D.
Shelley Diehl Geballe, BA, J.D., M.P.H.
Lee Gelernt, B.A., M.Sc., J.D.
Jeffrey Gentes, B.A., J.D.
Frederick S. Gold, BA., J.D.
Gregg Gonsalves, B.S.
Benjamin Heineman, BA, B.Litt., J.D.
Rebecca M. Heller, BA., J.D.
Stephen Hudspeth, BA, M.A., J.D.
Frank lacobucci, B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
Aaron Korman, BA. M.Sc., J.D.
Anika Singh Lemar, B.A., J.D.
Barbara B. Lindsay, A.B., J.D., LL.M.
Barbara Marcus, B.A., M.S., Ph.D.
Michael S. McGarry, A.B., J.D.
Jennifer Mellon, B.A., J.D.
Margaret M. Middleton, B.S., J.D.
Cantwell F. Muckenfuss, III, B.A., J.D.
Laurence P. Nadel, A.B., J.D.
Charles Nathan, B.A., J.D.
Ann M. Parrent, BA, J.D.
Andrew J. Pincus, BA., J.D.
Eric S. Robinson, A.B., M.BA., J.D.
David N. Rosen, BA, LL.B.
Charles A. Rothfeld, A.B., J.D.
Barry R. Schaller, BA, J.D.
David A. Schulz, B.A., MA., J.D.
Michael Solender, BA., J.D.
Laurence T. Sorkin, B.A., LL.B., LL.M.
Sidney H. Stein, A.B., J.D.
David J. Stoll, B.A., J.D.
ChristofR.A. Swaak, Ph.D.
Willard B. Taylor, BA, LL.B.
Thomas Ullmann, B.S., J.D.
Stefan Underhill, B.A., J.D.
John M. Walker, Jr., BA., J.D.
Michael Weisman, BA, J.D.
David M. Zornow, BA., J.D.
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